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Abstract. These essays were originally presented at a symposium of the same title
that took place at the annual meeting of the American Association of the Advancement
of Slavic Studies in Toronto on November 20, 2003. The charge to the participants
was to “to reread the book and make short presentations on it, its significance, the
validity of its analysis in hindsight, its historical contribution to our understanding of
late communism, its influence on others.” The symposium was timed to commemorate
the thirtieth anniversary of writing of the book in 1973–1974 as well as the twenty-fifth
anniversary of its publication in English in 1979.
Konrád and Szelényi’s model of socialism, twenty-five years later
KATHERINE VERDERY
University of Michigan
Konrád and Szelényi’s The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power
(henceforth Intellectuals) exerted a powerful influence on our thinking
about sociopolitical organization in Eastern Europe. In rereading it
now, I find that the remarkable contribution it made has deepened with
age; it is even better than I remembered from my first reading of it in
1988. I discover much that is deeply familiar from my years of living
in Romania before 1989, and I take great pleasure in its tremendous
range, as it moves from history to social theory to political sociology,
from Marx to Bakunin to Lenin to Weber to Polanyi. Furthermore, it
displays an extraordinary breadth and coherence of vision, especially
evident in its remarkable discussion of the history of East European
intellectuals (part III) but manifest throughout. The relentless logic and
“rationality” of their argument, covering many disparate areas of life
in socialism, are overwhelming.
There are several ways in which we might read this book, my col-
leagues’ essays here being some examples. Among them are to assess
either its predictions for the rise of a new class of “intellectuals” or the
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productivity of its mode of analysis. In my view, although its predictions
were provocative, they were ultimately flawed – and while they may
have had impact on political action in Hungary or Eastern Europe, it is
not clear they had a significant influence upon scholarship in the United
States. The book’s mode of analysis, by contrast, was extremely pro-
ductive for thinking about the nature of socialist societies – which they
state as their main aim, and it was understood as such by reviewers
like Alec Nove.1 In my comments, I do not take on the question of
whether intellectuals formed a new class but instead I concentrate on
their model of socialism; it is there that I see the book’s main influence.
The image of socialism in Intellectuals descends from a worthy line of
ancestors and has numerous cousins. They include Bakunin, Trotsky,
and Djilas, as well as other East Europeans writing in the late 1960s
into 1970s – the Poles Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski (whose
“Open Letter to the Communist Party” written in 1964 appeared in
English in 1968); the East German Rudolph Bahro (The Alternative
in Eastern Europe, published in Germany in 1977, four years after
Konrád and Szelényi’s manuscript was written); the Romanian Felipe
Garcia Casals (the pseudonym of Pavel Campeanu, whose Syncretic
Society first appeared in English in 1980 but was written sometime
before 1977); Czechs and Slovaks such as Václav Havel (his Power
of the Powerless first appeared in 1977)2 and Milan Šimecka (The
Normalization of Order, published in Czech in 1979)3; the Hungarians
György Bence and János Kis, who published their Towards an East
European Marxism in English under the pseudonym “Marc Rakovski”
in 1978),4 as well as Ferenc Fehér, Agnes Heller, and György Márkus
(their Dictatorship over Needs appeared in English in 1983). All these
works offered critical theoretical analyses of Soviet-type societies. You
have to have a taste for ideal-type models to find this kind of work a
useful heuristic exercise, and although some now see such taste as
outmoded, I myself have not lost it.
What is it that I particularly admire in this book? I single out three
things: the authors’ definition of intellectuals, their insistence on the
special teleological quality of those in Eastern Europe, and their start-
ing with Weber’s modes of domination rather than Marx’s modes of
production (as did several of the other critics of the system). First, in
their definition of intellectuals, they anticipate the arguments of people
like Pierre Bourdieu and Zygmunt Bauman.5 The authors argue that
one is an intellectual not because one has a certain amount of educa-
tion, a certain critical vocation, or a capacity to transcend narrow social
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and political interests: one is an intellectual according to the kinds of
claims through which one justifies one’s social position. According to
the authors, the intelligentsia seeks to obtain power and reward for
itself by exploiting its relative monopoly of complex knowledge as a
means of achieving these goals. The heart of the matter, then, is not
to be found in a knowledge that is functionally necessary, but rather
in the desire to legitimize aspirations to power. Thus it is not merely
knowledge that makes someone an intellectual, but the fact that he has
no other title to his status except for his knowledge.6
With this definition, the authors refuse East European intellectuals’
self-description, and they include in the category not only the techni-
cal or humanistic elite with its various forms of expertise but also the
ruling communist elite with its “scientific socialism.” The definition
also sets the predominant tone of the book: ironic, detached, and crit-
ical. Although some reviewers complained that the definition was too
broad, Konrád and Szelényi claimed that the “intellectual” category
was indeed very broad, precisely because the “vanguard party” placed
such emphasis on its superior knowledge of the laws of social develop-
ment in the planning process – that is, knowledge claims were lodged
at the very heart of rule, in a way very different from rule in capitalist
systems. I find this a brilliant way of trying to stand aside from the
way they themselves as well as their friends would define their own
place in Hungarian society, in order to arrive at a more useful analytic
treatment of their own stratum.7
Second, Konrád and Szelényi emphasize the historical specificity of in-
tellectuals in Eastern Europe as “teleological” intellectuals, their char-
acteristic form of rationality being not formal or procedural (Weber’s
Zweckrationalität) but substantive, ends- and values-oriented rational-
ity (Wertrationalität). Many critics seem to have missed this in the
book’s argument, complaining that its authors were attributing ration-
ality to a system that was far from rational;8 the critics failed to under-
stand that the form of rationality that Konrád and Szelényi intended was
quite different from the one in terms of which they themselves were
thinking. Socialist bureaucrats as well as nation-defining intellectuals
did operate in terms of a rationality, claims Intellectuals, but it was
one oriented to ends, not means. Those ends might differ – bureaucrats
envisioned a communist utopia while other intellectuals envisioned na-
tional liberation – but both operated in terms of teleologies. Konrád
and Szelényi’s notion of teleological intellectuals working in terms of
a moral mission is critical to understanding how so many intellectuals
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could end up in power after 1989: because they were seen to have high
moral capital.
Third, Konrád and Szelényi start from a novel vantage point: Weber’s
analysis of modes of authority or domination, as opposed to Marx’s
analysis of modes of production (contrast Márkus’s analysis in Dicta-
torship over Needs9). They take seriously the ideology of the socialist
system as their starting point (that is, they begin with “superstructure”
rather than “base”) and then offer a critique of it. This is unusual for a
self-professed Marxist analysis, and to my mind it afforded them valu-
able new insights. Asking what the dominant principles of legitimation
are in socialism, that is, what justifies the Party’s claims to appropriate
the social surplus and to determine how to reproduce ongoing social
and political life, they answer that what legitimates the socialist system
is the dominant ideology of “rational redistribution.” It begins in the
slogan “From each according to his ability, to each according to his
need” (modified by Lenin as “to each according to his work,” until
sufficient abundance could be achieved to reward according to need).
All else flows from here.
Given the dominant role of the Communist Party and its ideology in
the economy, this makes more sense than starting with socialism’s
mode of production. It also makes more sense given the situation in
Hungary at the time. By the end of the 1970s, Hungary had achieved
its reputation as the exemplar of goulash communism, in which the
Party in effect agreed to maintain an acceptable standard of living in
exchange for people’s not opposing the Party leadership. Under these
circumstances, it made good sense to analyze socialism by examining
consumption and the ideologies supporting it. In my opinion this is why
Intellectuals could only have been written in Hungary; for Romania,
that starting point would not have made as much sense. (We can see this
by contrasting Intellectuals with Campeanu’s Syncretic Society, whose
picture of socialism could scarcely be more different from theirs).
Let me use this observation to point to a couple of problems that I see
with the model of socialism offered in this book. First, Szelényi himself
says that the analysis better suits the 1960s and early 1970s than later
and agrees that it suits Hungary much better than elsewhere – Hungary,
with its intellectuals deeply implicated in its extensive reforms, its
higher level of consumption, and its second economy, which (they say)
pressed social stratification in a different direction from that of the other
countries.10 I conclude from this that their theoretical arguments may
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be limited (not surprisingly) to socialisms approaching the Hungarian
type, and that we should be cautious in applying those arguments to
countries like Romania or Bulgaria, very different from Hungary. This
caution is bred, of course, by the shortcomings of all such ideal-type
models: inevitably, some cases fit better than others.
Second, Konrád and Szelényi argue that from the viewpoint of rational
redistributors, the system’s basic principle is to maximize the surplus
available for redistribution:
For the redistributors the economy is rational if it maximizes the size of the
surplus product made available for redistributive decision; if, in other words,
the percentage of the national income which is drawn into the state budget
for purposes of redistribution is as large as possible. The bigger the budget,
the greater the power of the officials who administer it.11
I fear, however, that this is overly simplistic. For one thing, to administer
such a budget requires a level of bureaucratic capacity that communist
parties did not necessarily have. For another, that analysis provides us
with an account only of simple, rather than extended, reproduction. Per-
haps more useful, I think, is maximizing not the surplus available for
redistribution but the Party’s monopoly control over the redistributable
surplus – not the same thing. In the work of Pavel Campeanu12 and
Jan Gross13 we find two analyses that in my view improve Konrád
and Szelényi’s proposition. Campeanu argues that the motor of social-
ist systems was to maximize the accumulation not of redistributables
but of the means of production under the Party’s control; these will
then repeatedly create further resources for redistribution (that is, his
is a model of extended reproduction). If the system maximized only
the accumulation of redistributables, as Konrád and Szelényi indicate,
these might be used up every year. Jan Gross adds to this the idea of
the “spoiler state” as a characteristic of socialist systems: a state that
spoils alternative possibilities for anyone else to gain independent ac-
cess to resources, for to permit this would facilitate challenges to the
center’s mobilization of resources. Hence the persecution of second-
economy activity – in most East European countries except Hungary.
I think Gross’s argument affords us deeper insight into the following
statement by Konrád and Szelényi:
Rational-redistributive society . . . can best be described as a dichotomous
class structure in which the classical antagonism of capitalist and proletarian
is replaced by a new one between an intellectual class being formed around
the position of the redistributors, and a working class deprived of any right
to participate in redistribution.14
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Just as Marx pointed to the tension between the capitalists’ desire to
maximize profits and the systemic drive to maximize surplus value, the
tension in socialism is between the bureaucrats’ desire to maximize
the accumulation of redistributables and the systemic drive to maxi-
mize monopoly control over them by undermining alternative loci of
production outside the purview of the state. Yet we arrive at this for-
mulation only by questioning the very fruitful way in which Konrád
and Szelényi posed the central question: how is socialism legitimated?
Let me close now with some thoughts concerning my own discipline,
anthropology. When I discovered Intellectuals in 1988, no one in my
field had commented on it – but then again, hardly anyone in my field
was working in Eastern Europe at the time. Why might an anthropolo-
gist have been susceptible to this book? To begin with, in the 1970s and
1980s anthropology in the United States was much influenced by Marx-
ist analysis in general and French structural Marxism in particular; both
predisposed us to the idea that we can identify inner logics of different
modes of production. Such logics were the goal of analysis for scholars
such as Claude Meillassoux, Emmanuel Terray, Catherine Coquéry-
Vidrovitch, and Maurice Godelier in France, all writing about the logic
of the “lineage mode of production.” In the United States, the work of
Eric R. Wolf, especially his magisterial Europe and the People With-
out History, had similar effect.15 (Not that anthropologists had never
thought in terms of “system logics,” albeit in a different sense – what
else is the message of, for instance, Ruth Benedict’s celebrated Patterns
of Culture?) This widely accepted paradigm in the anthropology of the
1970s-1980s made Konrád and Szelényi’s book easy for an anthropol-
ogist to like, for it did the same kind of thing.
In anthropology there was the additional assumption that part of a
system’s logic would include not only forces and relations of production
but also “culture.” This was the legacy of Franz Boas, who brought
German thought into U.S. anthropology; it also reflected the influence
of Max Weber upon the eminent anthropologist Clifford Geertz, both of
whom anthropologists read in theory courses. With Boas, Weber, and
Geertz, U.S. anthropologists (unlike our British counterparts) found
culture essential to any social analysis; therefore Konrád and Szelényi’s
way of looking to Weber and to culture (in the form of ideology) to
discover the system logic of socialism was very congenial to us.
Finally, I would point to the significance of Karl Polanyi, with his
modes of economic integration, in the economic anthropology of the
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1970s. There we found the idea of redistributive societies as forming a
major class alongside societies governed by reciprocity or the market.
This idea, and Polanyi’s insistence on seeing the economy as culturally
embedded, plays a major role in Konrád and Szelényi’s analysis, further
predisposing it to consumption by anthropologists.
Thus, the conditions were present for anthropologists to give
Intellectuals a positive reception. The problem, however, was that
practically no one in anthropology was working in Eastern Europe
or was interested in models of socialism. I read the book ten years
after it came out, along with other works mentioned above, having
decided that for my book on national ideology under socialism I
needed a model of socialism to frame the processes I described.
My reading of Weber for my undergraduate thesis, my familiarity
with Polanyi from graduate courses, my eleven years of expo-
sure to Marxism in the anthropology department at Johns Hopkins
University, and my admiration for the work of Eric Wolf all came to-
gether to make my reading of Intellectuals a profoundly stimulating
one.
The model of socialism that I gradually worked out was deeply in-
debted to Konrád and Szelényi, as well as to György Márkus, János
Kornai, and Pavel Campeanu.16 Since this synthetic model of socialism
is the most widely cited argument in the anthropology of socialism and
postsocialism, we see that Intellectuals has ongoing influence in an-
thropology. The events of postsocialism are revealing the inadequacies
of that synthetic model, but keeping an eye on Ivan’s more recent work
will stimulate further rethinking of what socialism was, and how that
affects what comes next.
The failure to consolidate class power and the end of Soviet-type
regimes in East Central Europe
MICHAEL BERNHARD
Pennsylvania State University
I read Konrád and Szelényi as a graduate student when it first came
out. Along with the early works of other East European oppositionists
(in fact, the same round of suspects mentioned in Katherine Verdery’s
essay), it had a profound effect on my thinking at that time. I can think of
several other young American scholars who were affected in the same
way (among those participating in the symposium, Michael Kennedy).
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First, it sensitized us to the fact that there were unofficial forms of social
and intellectual life that had escaped the notice of the popular media
and many scholars studying Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
We were struck that such phenomena were understudied and that they
represented a new and significant development in the politics of the
region. We were confirmed in this belief by the emergence of Solidarity
in Poland.
Second, it made us aware that it was possible to step outside the context
of the Cold War and do critical work on the nature of Soviet-type soci-
eties. It was not that most of us did not find Cold War issues interesting,
did not take them seriously, or have strong feelings about the conflict
between the West and the Soviet Bloc; it was just that we thought that
to have a true picture of these societies, one had to distance oneself
intellectually from the rhetoric of both sides. The book was inspiring
in that it attempted to do just that.
The most profound effect the book had on my thinking about Soviet-
type societies at the time was the way in which it extended the concept
of class in a way that went beyond Marx and even Weber, and made it
relevant to an understanding of Soviet-type societies. It seemed clear
that one of the ways in which Soviet-type systems failed miserably to
live up to the ethical aims of socialism was in the replacement of one
form of class society with another. Konrád and Szelényi’s contention
that there is a specific social relation around which classes form in
any modern society was an enduring step forward. Here I refer to their
idea that each society has a model of economic integration. Here they
used Polyani to get out of the trap of property relations and ownership
defining class in a Marxian sense. Marxist conceptualizations led to
the treatment of intellectuals in Soviet-type societies as a stratum and
this clearly limited our ability to engage in a critical analysis of the
whole social formation due to the importance of intellectuals in it.
Konrád and Szelényi instead posed the idea that intellectuals exercised
(or were beginning to exercise) class power based on knowledge, which
legitimated their role in the teleological redistribution of wealth. Like
Katherine Verdery, I find the idea that this sort of redistributive power
was central to Soviet-type societies to be an essential and enduring
contribution.
In rereading the book, like Gale Stokes, I was struck by its ambi-
guity about the actual status of the class rule of intellectuals. In my
case though, this ambiguity is one of the focuses of my essay. At
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times Konrád and Szelényi talk about intellectuals as a ruling class
being in statu nascendi,17 and at other times they seem to speak as
if this were already a fait accompli. A related ambiguity concerns
the relationship of the communist party elite and the intellectual class
as a whole. It is not fully clear to me whether the elite is seen by
the authors as an element of the class, or as in some sense standing
over it.
Here it is useful to review what Konrád and Szelényi say about the class
generally. It is composed of three strata; the first of which is composed
of economists and technocrats. This first stratum “actually carries out
the work of rational redistribution.” It is joined by an administrative and
police bureaucracy “which guarantees the undisturbed functioning of
the redistributive process” and “the ideological, scientific, and artistic
intelligentsia, which produces, perpetuates, and disseminates the cul-
ture of rational redistribution.”18 At the time of the writing of the book
Konrád and Szelényi talk of rule being based on an alliance between
the ruling elite and the technocracy.19 Yet at other times they say that
the role of the elite is to look to the interests of the class as a whole.20
What remains unclear to me is how the elite tends to the interests of
the class as a whole, yet enters into alliance with one component of it,
the technocracy.
Another impression that rereading the book made upon me was that
the perspective was clearly marked by the time and place of its
writing. There are two factors particularly relevant to the time and
place of the book’s origins, Hungary in the 1970s. First, pre-modern
Hungary was one of the few countries in the region that had a large
and dominant gentry class. With the rise of modernity, elements from
the gentry adapted themselves to changed circumstances by becoming
intellectuals. The ethos of the gentry, its traditions, and its self-identity
as central to the nation remained part of the culture of the intellectual
class even under communism. The only other countries with as strong
an intellectual tradition were Poland and the Czechlands, though in the
case of the latter, the social origins were different.21 The question that
this raises is the extent to which the centrality of intellectuals was a
general characteristic of Soviet-type systems or was it a particularity
of its transposition to those parts of Central Europe that already had a
strong intelligentsia?
The second factor that bears raising here is that Hungary was excep-
tional with regard to economic reform among Communist countries.
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Two aspects are particularly relevant. First, rationalization of the sys-
tem of planning by the incorporation of market elements was far
more advanced in Hungary than anywhere else, except perhaps for
Yugoslavia. Second, the adoption of these policies was spearheaded
by an in-party reformist intelligentsia, a formation that again was
comparatively strong in Hungary.22 Thus the picture of the technoc-
racy and the elite in alliance with each other makes strong sense in
Hungary.
The question is whether this alliance makes sense anywhere else in the
Soviet bloc in the 1970s. At least from the perspective of Poland, it
makes a certain amount of sense in the early 1970s when the Gierek
regime attempted to revitalize the Polish economy by an import-led
growth strategy that relied on an influx of western technology financed
by loans. This too was a technocratic response to the limitations of
the planned economy. With the outright failure of these reforms, how-
ever, and the emergence of a persistent state of crisis in Poland from
1976–1989, every fraction of the intellectual class was beset by conflict
and it in no way resembled a coherent political entity.
Within the technocracy, substantial differences emerged over the extent
to which the market and workers’ councils should be used to reform
the economy. The ideological, scientific, and artistic intelligentsia was
largely in open revolt against the regime for the whole period. And even
within the administrative and police bureaucracy there were differences
between soft- and hard-line factions over the degree of physical repres-
sion that should be used to restore order, with hard-line factions pushing
for even greater repression. Beyond this, there was intense antipathy
between the different groups, especially the political and cultural com-
ponents of the class. In Poland by the late 1970s, we see a class at war
with itself for the soul of the nation.
By way of comparison to Czechoslovakia, the moment of rationalizing
reform of the economy in that country came and went with the Prague
Spring. With the post-1968 normalization, the political and adminis-
trative elite successfully confined the technocracy and the cultural elite
into a straightjacket of orthodoxy.23 Thus in the Czechlands, we see
a hard-line elite forcibly repressing even the most moderate reform
efforts of intellectuals. The nature of rule and role of the intellectual
class in both Poland and Czechoslovakia seems to be startlingly dif-
ferent from the pattern in Hungary. In neither of these countries does
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the picture resemble consolidated class rule. This stands in sharp con-
trast to Hungary, where after the post-1956 normalization the party was
careful to cultivate reformist intellectuals and tried to keep them within
the bounds of the party, even when reform efforts were sidetracked or
blocked. Thus, when the New Economic Mechanism was curtailed in
1973, economic reformers remained in the party despite the repres-
sion of more critical intellectuals.24 That reformist faction was able to
rebound and extend economic reform in 1979, and remained an im-
portant player in the party, as well as in the postcommunist successor
party.
So, if the notion of class rule by the intellectuals is something that
seems more plausible in Hungary, and to a certain extent in Poland
and Czechoslovakia, in the 1960s and 1970s than anywhere else in the
Soviet bloc, does this limit the importance of Konrád and Szelényi’s
analysis? My answer is no. The historical juncture captured in the book
is one that is critical to the development of Soviet-type systems. The
1960s and 1970s constitute the period when the redistributive model of
economic development came to the limit of its utility as an alternative
to capitalism.25 Soviet-type systems were adept at promoting extensive
growth, in mobilizing underutilized resources in agrarian economies,
and at channeling them into the industrial sector. They were good at
creating new sources of capital and labor and deploying them in the
economy. However, in the 1960s and 1970s, most bloc economies were
fully mobilized and if they were to continue to develop, they needed
to find sources of intensive growth, i.e., make existing endowments
of capital and labor more productive. The economic reforms proposed
during the Prague Spring, the Hungarian NEM, and Gierek’s attempts
to use western technology bought on credit were all somewhat different
responses to this problem.
This was the moment in the history of Soviet-type systems that the
book so effectively captures. Given the critical importance of knowl-
edge in the process of rationalizing the planned economy, it was a
moment when the intellectuals could potentially have played a greater
role in the system. Clearly the technocrats were the people with the
most to gain. One might nevertheless expect some tension between
those who worked in the institutions of centralized planning and
those at the level of the firm (with the latter group being the more
enthusiastic about decentralization). Perhaps the intelligentsia, too,
had something to gain, in that an economy of this type would put
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greater stress on education and knowledge, and this would probably
lead to weakening of the prohibitions on thought posed by censor-
ship, or even the dropping of formal censorship.26 It would seem,
however, that the political and administrative component of the in-
tellectual class would have the most to lose, as the decentralization in-
volved in economic reform would weaken their degree of control over
society.
Thus, it is not surprising that Central European intellectuals, given
the importance of the intelligentsia tradition in the region or the re-
gion’s place in the experimentation with reforms meant to rationalize
Soviet-type economies, would understand the ramifications of such
a moment for their class. Even more so, that Hungarian intellectuals
would strongly perceive such a moment, given that country’s higher
degree of success with reform, is also logical.
The potential limitation in the analysis presented in the book is not the
apprehension of the historical importance of the moment at which it was
written, but that the moment itself did not fully reach its fruition. Such
experiments proved to be enduring only in Hungary and Yugoslavia,
with the Jaruzelski regime in Poland continuing to toy with such ideas
without fully embracing them. And even in Hungary and Yugoslavia,
the reforms were not sufficient to fend off economic stagnation. That
Konrád and Szelényi did not see this coming in 1974 is not surprising;
after all they only claimed to be framing a critical theory of Soviet-type
societies, not practicing divination.27
In retrospect, the class rule of intellectuals was something inherently
possible in the history of Soviet-type regimes, but with the defeat of
rationalizing economic reform in 1960s and 1970s, it did not come
to pass. Instead, the ruling elite in these societies remained inherently
political. As the Leninist party transformed itself into the ruling kernel
of a vast bureaucratic system under Stalin, something historically un-
precedented emerged: a sovereign bureaucracy. In this it was radically
different from other bureaucracies that ordinarily act as the agent of
some other set of social interests. This is what Polish sociologist Maria
Hirszowicz argued in her book on the bureaucratic Leviathan state that
emerged in Russia, Eurasia, and Eastern Europe.28 This bureaucracy
ruled in its own interest, but as its transformative historical mission fal-
tered and its ideological ardor cooled in favor of the mundane interests
of its adherents, it could no longer effectively manage the complex,
modern, class society it had created.29
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Konrád and Szelényi cannot be faulted for not anticipating the politi-
cal failure of economic reforms from the vantage point of 1973–1974.
Still, the rejection of the reform moment they capture in the work not
only prevented the consolidation of intellectual class rule, but also
helps to explain why Soviet-type systems collapsed so quickly. When
the political elite rejected the reforms of the 1960s and 1970s, they
not only failed to address the crisis of intensive growth in the econ-
omy, but also lost the political support of a substantial portion of the
intellectual class. By the 1980s, intellectuals had very little to lose by
abandoning the system, even second-tier party leaders (who today cu-
riously seem to make up a good part of the club of postcommunist
prime ministers in the region). Ironically, in the absence of substantial
private property, their social capital, connections (both domestic and
international), and educational advantages positioned intellectuals to
do well economically and politically under a liberal-democratic mar-
ket system. In “succeeding,” however, they have converted their social
power under one system into new forms of power under yet another.
Thus, while intellectuals have generally done well both as a group and
as individuals since 1989, they seem to have abandoned the project of
intellectual class rule altogether. This too is an irony not anticipated by
Konrád and Szelényi, but one that I am sure they appreciate.
Irony and continuity in East European history: Thoughts on
Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power
JEFFREY KOPSTEIN
University of Toronto
Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power can be read on at least two
levels. Both involve strong ironies. On one level, the one on which I first
read it, it is a contribution to a Marxist analysis of East European com-
munism, which pointed to a familiar theme of emancipatory intentions
and universalist ideologies ultimately being tools of domination and
particular interests. Konrád and Szelényi framed their book as an alter-
native to the narrative of totalitarianism, a narrative that identified the
core features of communism as political dictatorship and bureaucratic
economy. Theirs was an immanent critique of the system that permitted
direct cross-systemic comparison with the West and was supplemented
with a sort of negative cunning of history in which the tools and ide-
ologies of emancipation were ultimately turned against the objects of
liberation, the working class, and for the particular benefit of the people
who thought they were doing the emancipating, the intellectuals.
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At a second, deeper, level, however, this book is also a study in the
irony of historical continuity that is particular to the region of East-
Central Europe. It is on this second irony that I would like to focus my
attention in this short essay. In contrast to what many historians and
political scientists were still teaching their students in the 1970s and
1980s, that 1945 represented a radical break with the past in Eastern
Europe, Konrád and Szelényi put forth in their book an intriguing
thesis of continuity between the pattern of modernization in Eastern
Europe after the Napoleonic Wars until 1945 and what occurred under
communist rule. This pattern Konrád and Szelényi termed “rational
redistribution.” The “rational” here referred not to “optimal” but rather
to the intention of the late modernizers to use the enlightenment tools
of state and statecraft to catch up with the more economically and
militarily advanced West.
The result was the familiar pattern of state-led modernization that con-
trasted with the market-led western pattern, and rendered class forma-
tion, the legitimate scope of state authority, dominant ideas about what
constitutes “the good life,” and just about everything else that matters
for political development different from what occurred in the West.
For example, in the East entrepreneurial functions were disproportion-
ately taken over by ethnically foreign elements, thus tainting the entire
enterprise of modernization as something somehow foreign. Most im-
portantly for Konrád and Szelényi, rational redistribution recast the role
of intellectuals, who were disproportionately made up of the sons of the
declining native noble and middle classes and who sought refuge from
the market in state employment, into a sort of service intelligentsia of
the state rather than an independent stratum of people who shaped the
background culture of the societies in which they lived. This particu-
larly toxic brew, a fusion between educated elites and an overweening
state apparatus, created the groundwork, even before 1945, for what
Konrád and Szelényi maintained was a gradual transformation of the
educated classes of Eastern Europe into the potentially dominant class
in the communist period.
Helping us to situate the communist period within the broader frame-
work of East European economic and political development and posing
the question of how it should be situated will, I believe, be the lasting
contribution of this book. Much more so than the answers it provides,
this book is important for the questions it poses. Time and again, one is
drawn to the question of continuity and change. Rereading Intellectuals
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on the Road, one is tempted to look upon the communist era as one
where the basics of the “Eastern pattern” did not really change at all.
Today it still trails the West in economic development and is playing
“catch-up.” The countries of the region are once again bit players in
the game of international capitalism, competing against each other for
investment and trade opportunities. Its political elites are once again
trying to integrate themselves into the broader economic and security
structures of external powers. And, from the standpoint of Konrád and
Szelényi’s book, as well as Szelényi’s more recent work, the educated
classes in Eastern Europe have been busy trying to convert their intel-
lectual capital into financial and economic capital, even though these
intellectuals squabble with each other a bit too much, I think, to be
thought of as a “class” and they sloughed off the communist system
a bit too easily for me to think of them as having been the emerging
dominant players within it.
Even so, rereading this book does force one to ask, what has changed?
Did communism matter at all? Did the “eastern pattern” simply con-
tinue under different ideological form? Is history then in some impor-
tant way doomed to repeat itself? The student of East-Central Europe
in 1990, looking back on the year 1919, could easily have been ex-
cused for believing just that, that history was about to repeat itself. In
both eras, inexperienced political elites confronted relatively backward
economies, collapsed trading blocs, polarized politics, and intractable
ethnic conflicts. After 1919, these problems quickly led to the collapse
of democracy in the region (with the notable exception of Czechoslo-
vakia). What was to keep these democracies from collapsing again?
To be sure, there has been significant democratic backsliding in the re-
gion, especially in the non-Baltic republics of the former Soviet Union.
Yet in the decade after 1989 there were encouraging signs of progress
toward democratic stability in many postcommunist Europe countries
that were in previous eras anything but stable. How did this progress
come about?
Poland’s interwar democracy collapsed in 1926 with Marshal Pilsud-
ski’s coup d’etat amid economic disorder, street demonstrations, and
decreasing confidence in political parties and parliamentary institu-
tions. Postcommunist Poland, by contrast, despite initial economic
conditions that were at least as unfavorable as its interwar counter-
part (parties and parliamentary institutions that were widely regarded
as self-serving and ineffective, and a level of protest that far exceeded
16
anything in the interwar era), was widely regarded by the end of the
1990s as the most dynamic democracy in the region and a pretty good
model for successful economic transformation. Similar observations
could be made for Estonia and Slovenia. And who would have thought
that Hungary, a country that did not have a single free and fair elec-
tion in the interwar period, would become the darling of the European
Union and its leading candidate for accession during the decade after
1989?
These observations, as stylized as they are, suggest that not only was
communism a period of continuities but also one of change. What
changed in Eastern Europe in the half century after 1939 that could
have helped alter the age-old “eastern pattern” Konrád and Szelényi so
compactly describe? Did communism have anything to do with this?
If so, one would be forced to rethink what it was about the communist
version of rational redistributionism that set the region down a new
path.
Several important changes did occur between the interwar and the post-
communist era. First on this list is the economic modernization that
occurred during the communist period. Most of the countries of the
region became more urban, less agrarian, and more educated than in
the interwar period. Przreworski and Limongi’s recent work indicates
the importance of having a GDP per capita of more than $6000 (in 1993
dollars) for sustaining democracy.30 It is noteworthy that many of the
countries of East-Central Europe passed through this threshold during
or just after the communist period. Even so, it is difficult to give the com-
munist governments of the region much credit for their economic per-
formance. Some growth may have occurred under virtually any social
order. The income disparities already present between East and West
before 1945 remained unchanged or grew between 1945 and 1989.31
In fact, communism in Eastern Europe was rejected in part because of
its dismal economic performance compared to Western Europe.
A second important change that occurred in the half-century between
1939 and 1989 also had little to do with rational redistribution per
se, namely the huge demographic changes that occurred during and
after World War II throughout the region. I refer here primarily to the
destruction of East European Jewry. As a result of the Holocaust, ethnic
entrepreneurship is no longer nearly the same kind of issue that it was
before 1945. Konrád and Szelényi explain anti-Semitism in modern
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Eastern Europe as an early reaction against rational redistribution. Yet
today, capitalist modernization is no longer viewed as being led by
completely alien elements, except by politically marginal and extremist
groups, for the simple reason that the aliens are no long present. Of
course, this change was also not primarily the work of the communists.
It was the work of the Nazis, which makes it all the more painful and
ironic. Societies such as interwar Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia
that were deeply multicultural in a genuine, as opposed to simulated
western, sense, are now basically mono-cultural and thus basically
safe for western style multiculturalism.32 The scapegoats of rational
redistribution, in particular the Jews, are simply no longer present.
The same can be said for the German minorities throughout the region
whose expulsion was the work of the communist authorities.
As important as both modernization and ethnic cleansing are in explain-
ing the relative success of post-communist democracy, I would like to
turn our attention to one further feature of the communist version of
rational redistribution. My own field, political science, has now spent
more than a decade analyzing the negative legacies of communist rule
and theorized about how the “Leninist legacies” can be overcome.33
Fewer scholars, however, have discussed the positive legacies of the
Leninist version of rational redistribution and how these legacies may
have helped pave the way for successful democracy and capitalist de-
velopment in the post-communist era. Yet as Konrád and Szelényi’s
book reminds us over and over again, one need not be an adherent
of Marxism-Leninism to appreciate the ironies of history. Thirty-five
years ago, Ralf Dahrendorf, in his classic Society and Democracy in
Germany, argued that Nazism destroyed the social basis for authoritari-
anism in Germany. Dahrendorf’s book and many others like it illustrate
how difficult it was for Germany to break with a closed, status-based
society. Brutal as it may have been, “the break with tradition and thus
the strong push toward modernity was the substantive characteristic
of the social revolution of National Socialism.”34 Among the many
tragedies of the Nazi dictatorship, Dahrendorf found one more painful.
If the resistance to Nazism, which was largely aristocratic in composi-
tion and which he refers to as “counterrevolutionary,” had succeeded in
assassinating Hitler and taking power, Germany’s chances for democ-
racy in the postwar period would have been far less certain. “While
the social revolution of National Socialism was an instrument in the
establishment of totalitarian forms, by the same token it had to cre-
ate the basis of liberal modernity; the counterrevolution on the other
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hand can be understood only as a revolt of tradition, and thus of illiber-
alism and of the authoritarianism of a surviving past.” Although Nazi
ideology was in many respects traditionalistic, the practice of Nazi rule
broke down the traditional loyalties on which German authoritarianism
depended.
So, too, one can argue for communist rule. As romantically as they were
sometimes viewed in the West during the Communist era and continue
to be even today, the societies of interwar Eastern Europe, with the
exception of the Czechlands, did not provide fertile soil for democracy.
Poland and Hungary, for example, were societies of deep inequalities in
which social distinctions could not easily be bridged. In this regard, it is
worth recalling Tocqueville’s comments on the United States, where he
argued that what distinguished the United States was that differences in
material wealth were not overlaid with stark distinctions in status. This
characteristic made for an essential equality of condition and created
the climate for healthy democracy. The opposite applies to most states
of interwar Eastern Europe. Not only were inequalities material, but,
perhaps more importantly, they involved status, the kind of inequality
that money does not easily overcome. The elites of these societies were
distinctly “clubbish” in their behavior and attitudes, and they did not
easily admit outsiders.
Could it not be true that part of the Leninist legacy in places like Poland
and Hungary was to create a rough and ready material and status equal-
ity and, therefore, the basis for democracy of the sort that could not
have possibly existed in the interwar societies? Of course, the priv-
ileges of the nomenklatura contradicted the official egalitarian ideal
and provided much grist for books such as Intellectuals on the Road to
Class Power. Once the party bosses could be pushed aside, however,
the social reality that remained, even though it was one that was marked
by inequalities and the potential for growth in inequalities that Szelenyi
has documented in his recent work, was in terms both of social status
and material condition, much more favorable to healthy liberal democ-
racy than it had ever been. Communism still did a great deal of dam-
age in other respects, both human and “developmental.” In the Czech
lands, for example, Communism yielded a decayed and backward in-
dustrial base and not much else (it was, then, in this sense “unneces-
sary”). Still, it is difficult to deny that there is a greater affinity between
democracy and Polish and Hungarian society today than seventy years
ago.
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Of course, it would be absurd to maintain that had the Hungarian revo-
lutionaries in 1956 managed to overthrow the regime, institute democ-
racy, and successfully declare Austrian-style neutrality that the country
would still have been better off remaining communist for thirty-three
more years – just as absurd as cheering for Hitler’s body guards in
July 1944. As social scientists we do not need to go that far. It may
simply be enough to note that one cumulative result of four decades of
communist rule has been, in some respects and in some countries, to
prepare the way for successful capitalist and democratic development
of the Western as opposed to Eastern sort.
The final important difference from the interwar era is the geopolitical
landscape. The international context that helped create rational redis-
tributionism and intensified its “perfection” under communism after
1945, namely the unequal and enduring economic development and
military capacities of East and West, is arguably much different today.
Whereas great power politics conspired before and after 1945 to keep
the pattern of development in Eastern Europe different from that in the
West, since 1989 we have witnessed a concerted effort to integrate the
states of Eastern Europe into the economic and security structures of
the West. A further irony of communism, then, is how the four decades
of forced isolation from the West created a deep and abiding long-
ing to return to a cooperative Europe that had never actually existed
before 1945. Furthermore, it was communism (or, more precisely, the
threat of communism) that provided the crucial impetus for overcom-
ing the historical divide between France and Germany, thus paving
the way for the uniting of Europe. It is worth recalling that, although
the revolutions of 1989 were made in the name of liberal democracy,
this regime type had been instituted successfully almost nowhere in
Eastern Europe. Much more important for liberalism’s attractiveness
was the relentless cultural cold war waged by the West against the
East over a forty-year period that held up Western Europe as a model
that could be emulated in the East, if only it were not for Commu-
nism. After 1989, the promise of joining the West and especially the
prospect of joining the European Union, combined with the absence
of viable ideological and institutional alternatives (like Communism),
was so strong that even countries that had little in the way of democratic
traditions, well developed capitalist middle classes, bourgeois virtues,
or the economic “prerequisites” of democracy have consistently emu-
lated western modes of political conduct and discourse in the hope of
securing a place among the elect. To the extent that the new Europe
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of cooperative rather than conflictual development is extended to the
East, the international foundations of rational redistribution may no
longer exist.
There are then perhaps even deeper ironies to rational redistribution
than Konrád and Szelényi could see when they wrote this book in
the 1970s. For although rational redistribution appeared to them as
the “perfection” of the Eastern pattern of modernization, it may also
have helped foster both the domestic and international conditions for
shattering the pattern of continuity in East-Central Europe. In addition
to the legacies of the past half century that had nothing to do with
communism itself, the impact of both communism’s rough and ready
egalitarianism and the new Europe made attractive by the predations of
communism, may have decisively altered the confining conditions in
which the post-communist democracies of East-Central Europe find
themselves today. Of course, to the degree that these societies are
unable to sustain a basic egalitarian ethos and to the extent that the
promise of joining the “West” is not kept by the West itself, or is
enlarged to a select few societies, the conditions that gave rise to and
sustained rational redistribution three centuries ago may not be gone for
good.
The irony of Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power
GALE STOKES
Rice University
One of the most intriguing things about Konrád and Szelényi’s book,
returning to it after twenty-five years, is how pleasing it is (surprising
would not be the right word) to find what a good piece of work it is. A
great many of its ideas have entered into the conventional wisdom as
appropriate templates for the historical development of Eastern Europe
and the text is logically and often convincingly argued. The book’s an-
alytic weakness, however, remains the same as when it first came out,
namely, the confusion surrounding the standing of the various subsets
of the intellectual class in what the authors call the second stage of
socialism, the stage in which they were actually writing. Even though
the authors clearly recognize that it is not the intellectual class as a
whole but the ruling or governing elite that actually fulfills the func-
tions of central redistribution,35 the latter portions of the book exhibit
considerable confusion between the intelligentsia as an entire class and
its subsets, primarily the technocracy and the elites. The authors frame
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their discussion as a friendly conversation with Milovan Djilas, partic-
ularly with his concept of the new class.36 There is no question that this
book is more sophisticated than Djilas’s analysis, and that the authors
are more skilled theoreticians. But whereas appropriate certification is
necessary for advancement into the intelligentsia, it is not sufficient for
the exercise of real power. That comes only with complaisant behav-
ior toward the elite into which the intelligent is attempting to move.
Therefore, one might ask if even the title of the book is adequate.
Could intellectuals reasonably have been seen to be on a road to class
power, or would it have been more plausible to recognize that they
were enmeshed in a system of subservience to those who dominated
the structures within which they had to operate? Clearly this is an unfair
question, shaped by twenty-five years of hindsight. But it does raise
the issue not just of how valid this analysis was, but how valid class
analysis in general is, even when applied in such an insightful way as
was the case in this book.
Perhaps the most delightful thing about this book is its wonderfully
ironic style. The authors have a witty way of making their points. For
example, “In the bourgeois democracies public opinion would see in
a loss of the workers’ vote a repudiation of the axiom that ‘the Com-
munist Party is the party of the working class’ – a petty, positivistic
conclusion from the standpoint of the logic of rational redistribution.
The Communist parties that have come to power have made it their
first order of business to free themselves from the obligation, so un-
worthy of their historic mission, of participating in the vote-getting car-
nival of bourgeois-democratic elections.”37 “Elections become grand
but still heartfelt demonstrations of the unity of the toiling masses.
The candidates share the proud good humor of their electors, for in
these festive rites of substantive democracy they, unlike the candi-
dates in the formal democracies cannot lose their seats.”38 Such exam-
ples could be multiplied. They add immeasurably to the impact of the
book.
The authors’ ironic style is reminiscent of that great classic by
Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class. There are in
fact substantive links between these two works that go beyond style.
When Veblen speaks of leisure, of course, he does not refer to indo-
lence. “What [leisure] connotes,” he says, “is non-productive use of
time.”39 The redistributive economy provides countless examples of
this kind of leisure. The endless committee meetings, rallies, indoc-
trination efforts and the like conspicuously show one’s willingness to
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participate in the intellectual class by expending prodigious amounts
of non-productive time. The elites have an even more decorous and
honorific way to demonstrate their ability to spend time in non-
productive activities through interminable party conferences, ritual-
istic television appearances, visiting factories, contentless speeches,
and so forth, all of which fall under what Veblen calls “the great eco-
nomic law of wasted effort.”40 They satisfy the need of the elites to
reach out, once again in Veblen’s language, for “some form of [ap-
parently] purposeful activity that. . . at the same time [is] not indeco-
rously productive. . ..”41 Veblen’s point is that for the public persona
of the leadership “to be reputable, it must be wasteful,”42 a condi-
tion amply displayed by the activities of the elites in the redistributive
economy.
In the capitalist world, Veblen says, “esteem is gained and dispraise is
avoided by putting one’s efficiency in evidence.”43 This is true of what
Konrád and Szelényi call the technocracy. But, as they point out, while
pure efficiency may be a refuge for some, it is not the criterion by which
social decisions are made in the redistributive economy. Instead they
are made through reciprocal relations of clientage. Even though the
technocrats often justify their decisions to the public and even perhaps
to themselves on the basis of rationality and efficiency, they actually
make what adjustments appear needed to retain the favor of the elites,
whatever the actual efficiency of the decision might be. This ordinary
human propensity to interpret situations in ways that will please one’s
superiors is raised to a structural element in redistributive economies.
The elites on their side can and do protect their clients, often without
regard to efficiency, while at the same time enjoying the perquisites of
conspicuous consumption they believe befit their position – the black
chauffeured car, the special stores, the trip abroad. Even those at lower
levels engage in similar conspicuous consumption if they are able,
however inefficient the actual work involved – the truck driver who,
as Konrád and Szelényi mention, feels he must have a helper to lift
the packages onto the truck because he did not go to the trouble of
specialized training to be a truck driver to do such unskilled labor.
Veblen comments: “Labor acquires a character of irksomeness by virtue
of the indignity imputed to it.”44 However, as Veblen goes on to say,
and as Konrád and Szelényi would affirm, the assertion of the greater
honorability of truck driving, or at a higher level, of intellectual work,
“is in the last analysis little if anything else than a recognized successful
act of aggression.”45 And how is this honor gained in the redistributive
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economy? Not, as in Veblen’s case, through the accumulation of wealth,
but rather by the accumulation of intellectual merit points, the degrees,
certifications, and party schools, as well as, most of all, by the ample
demonstration of loyalty to the leadership. Those who are successful
in this become thought of as omni-competent, deemed able to run
a factory, a university department, or a government office. Having
achieved such a position, the successful individual is in a position to
begin dispensing favors and finding ways to emphasize his (usually
not her) lofty position through honorific displays. It is not property
that is the “most easily recognized evidence of a reputable degree of
success”46 in the redistributive economy, nor is it the condition of
being an intellectual in itself that grants such a status, but the position
of leadership itself.
Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power focuses on the redistributive
economy, that is, on Soviet-style systems. It is quite obvious why this
is so. Nevertheless, the assumption on which these economies oper-
ated – that human beings could discover and implement rational, even
scientific, methods of social engineering for society’s benefit – was
part and parcel of a larger system of modern thought that James C.
Scott calls “high modernism.”47 Scott argues that an ideology of ra-
tional scientism characterizes not only the Soviet and East European
communist experience, but the entire twentieth-century world. High
modernists create, or perhaps are used by, states that attempt, through
various controls on the population, to make all aspects of the society
transparent to those in power. Scott uses the Soviet experience as one
of his case studies, but he also uses others, such as Brasilia, the com-
pletely planned but dead city, and “villagization” in Tanzania, which
destroyed an unkempt but vital village culture in favor of unproductive
and sterile geometrically modeled living quarters. The redistributors
justified the imposition of their impractical but intellectually attrac-
tive abstractions on societies by professing an ideology that valorized
a scientific and logical, but actually ideological, world view. Konrád
and Szelényi’s ironic stance fits well into the twentieth century’s great-
est irony–by imposing an ideology they believed would bring ben-
efits and well being, the high modernists actually caused enormous
suffering and hardship. In other words, the phenomena that are the
central empirical data from which Konrád and Szelényi were working
are characteristic of a certain kind of approach to the world that per-
vaded the twentieth century, and was not exclusively an East European
concern.
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The ironies of intellectuals on the road to power, or not48
MICHAEL D. KENNEDY
University of Michigan
The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power was the single most
important book for me during my graduate school days, and was de-
cisive for my dissertation and my first book.49 Within my discipline,
Ivan Szelényi himself has been one of the most, if not the most, im-
portant sociologist working on East European social structures and
social transformations. For these two reasons, I am especially de-
lighted to contribute to this discussion on the book’s place twenty-five
years later, but not only for nostalgia’s sake. By focusing intensively
on The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power (hereafter The In-
tellectuals) and one of its authors we can learn much about knowl-
edge cultures during and after communism, within and beyond Eastern
Europe.
This ambition led me to break one of the rules my colleagues followed
more honorably than I for the symposium that led to this publication.
While I focus on The Intellectuals, I also attend to subsequent assess-
ments of its significance. I draw especially heavily on a videotaped
interview I conducted with Ivan in 1994,50 which itself provides the
best place to start: the conditions enabling the writing, and reception,
of The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power.
Conditions of The Intellectuals’ initial recognition
Ivan recalled the conditions leading to the book’s production. I draw
out three:
1. It was easy to be a critical social thinker under communist rule
because there were so many taboos; to be labeled innovative and
critical, one need only mark taboos.
2. Social conditions encouraged this critical disposition: the coffee
shop and party scene encouraged the intellectually ambitious to
radicalize ideas.
3. This radicalization always had an edge, however, for one was never
sure exactly what would be the result of these ideas, and whether
those who cheered you on one day would avoid you the next.
There was, however, the larger social environment that complicated
these issues still further. As Ivan watched the affinities of colleagues
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ebb and flow, everyone was watching what was happening elsewhere,
notably in the Soviet Union. At the very time of writing The Intellectu-
als, communist authorities had already expelled Aleksander Solzhen-
itysn from his homeland. Although the Hungarian conditions seemed
much more open, alternative futures were quite apparent to Ivan: for
this book, the authorities could imprison him, force him into exile, or
at least fire him as a researcher, forcing on him a political future rather
than the academic one he anticipated.
To be sure, this risk helped to make this book politically significant in
the West, but its analytical distinction was more important for its aca-
demic reception. My symposium colleagues have commented on the
importance we analysts of Soviet-type societies attributed to immanent
critiques, for they suggested a way out of the seduction into the intellec-
tually dubious and politically risky idealization of one system used to
criticize another.51 This book was different from other such critiques,
however, because it also offered such a well-argued and strong thesis: in
communist-led systems, superior teleological knowledge, rather than
property ownership per se, guarantees the right to dispose of society’s
surplus. Hence, to gain the right the bourgeoisie enjoys by virtue of
its property ownership, one must have “specialized knowledge” and
hence, be some kind of intellectual to become part of the ruling class
in what Konrád and Szelényi called “rational redistributive systems”
(p. 46).52
Substantially documented strong theses accompanied by political risk
tend to make books popular, but the book became additionally appeal-
ing in Western sociology because of how it sat neatly between the two
dominant styles of the day. On the one hand, this book used Marxist
analysis and invoked a class critique that made it resonate with the crit-
ical orientation of much of Western sociology. On the other hand, it was
also appealing to the Weberian inclination to avoid putting scholarship
directly in the service of politics in its attempt to describe the system
as it was, in what Ivan said later was relatively “value neutral.”
Finally, The Intellectuals also became significant because it came out
at a time that Western sociology was itself infatuated with the new
class and intellectuals. In part, this was a reflection of 1968, where
the baby boomer rebellions birthed a whole series of reflections on
intellectual responsibility and power. Alvin Gouldner was the leading
sociologist working on this,53 but there were others, and this book fit in
marvelously, then, with a larger series that was not quite Marxist, but
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like the spirit of Theory and Society, quite critical. This was apparent in
Ivan’s introduction to the English language version of The Intellectuals
(p. xvi) but it was also exemplified by the publication of Ivan’s synthetic
article in Marxist Inquiries,54 the essay in a special American Journal
of Sociology supplement. Sociologists thus read The Intellectuals, and
Ivan’s work through a lens that found his class analysis and critique of
intellectuals resonant with a larger current of critical sociology.
The Intellectuals had a third quality, however, that Western sociology
hardly appreciated, but nevertheless was critical to its East European
resonance and its renewed significance: the irony in which it was bathed.
Before this symposium, I expected to make an original contribution
with this emphasis, but as this collection of papers suggests, most of
us found irony to be a major, if not central quality, of the work’s value.
However, we don’t locate irony in the same place, nor is it apparent why
it’s so obviously important today. I shall conclude my remarks with a
few preliminary reflections on irony’s importance in our academic and
public culture today, but begin with a subject I feel more confident: the
sub-disciplinary focus that made the book resonate so powerfully with
Western sociology in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
The ironic sociology of intellectuals
A critical sociology of intellectuals, by intellectuals, is, in the end,
necessarily and deeply, ironic, and becomes better to the extent it marks
that irony not only explicitly but also with charm. Konrád and Szelényi
succeeded at both. Consider, for instance,
The intellectuals, in other words, did not think of themselves as an intelli-
gentsia; they identified with the social class or group from which they sprang
or whose interests they expressed. They fell into the same ironic trap of his-
torical self-projection as did those bourgeois revolutionaries, the Jacobins
who thought themselves the spokesman of the whole people (p. 72).
Thus the lucky groups of intellectuals whom the administrators of research
work select to harness to their expensive equipment come increasingly to
feel their alienation from research which is imposed on them from above and
which, by reason of its high degree of specialization, can no longer be com-
prehended in its entirety. . . (p. 78). We might say that they wished to preserve
the intellectual character of their labor power, rather than see themselves re-
duced to mere owners of labor-power. To put it more ironically, they wished
to preserve their character of owners of a special kind of capital (p. 79).
We must confess that for Eastern European intellectuals the temptation to
forge ahead on forbidden paths is very strong. Imagine an ardent hunter who
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after prowling around for ages in potato fields suddenly stumbles onto a game
preserve whose keepers have not allowed anyone in living memory to hunt
or even photograph the game. He can be certain that even without a crack
rifle and a peerless eye he can still acquire there trophies which will give
him the reputation of a matchless nimrod and make him the toast of every
field-and-stream show. Similarly, the intellectual who sets out to explore the
reservation of ideological taboos is drawn to forbidden territory not so much
by an indominatable heroism which shrinks from no dangers by the prospect
of an easy bag, and by the reward not only of the abstract joy of intellectual
discovery but of domestic and even international acclaim for his original
achievement (pp. 237–238).
Here, then, is the powerful tension within this work, one that makes
irony central to its social science. Intellectuals are prone to write pow-
erful critiques of what is, implying what ought to be, erasing their own
self-interest in that projection. This self-interest is extended under state
socialism, potentially leading to the class rule of the intelligentsia, but
only to the extent that one dimension of that intellectual work – those
who know better should decide the allocation of the system’s
surplus – defines dominance. In this system, intellectual autonomy
declines, and intellectual taboos proliferate, increasing the value of
ideas themselves. Talk about irony!
While this point is well known,55 using it to think about the book’s
significance is not so common. The contradictoriness of intellectual
value under communist rule could appear to reduce the significance of
the book itself. Is this book great only because it says something that
is taboo? Of course the book’s erudition and insight are obvious, as
Katherine Verdery emphasizes in this symposium, but this very doubt
becomes part of the book’s ironic charm. Sociologists hardly acknowl-
edged this charm in their reception of it, however, in part because of
the times in which it was received. Now, however, we would do well
to develop this side of this work’s value, something Ivan himself has
emphasized for at least the last decade.
During his 1994 interview, I asked Ivan about the relations between his
own trajectories of intellectual development and the social transfor-
mations through which he lived. Under state socialism, he said, things
did not change much. When he left in 1975 and came back for the
first time in 1982, things had not changed significantly, or at least they
had not changed in ways that he would not have otherwise expected.
In the mid-1990s, by contrast, things were changing so rapidly, and in
such unexpected ways, that it was hard to have the same feeling or the
same confidence that one understood the changes. Opening Eastern
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Europe to a global professional sociology did not produce the same
intellectual confidence, nor did it produce the same kind of intellec-
tual consequence, at least in the conventional terms we think about
intellectuals. This, too, is a large irony.
Nonetheless, The Intellectuals continued to provide an important foun-
dation for research. Indeed, one might argue that it became a clas-
sic in the literature around the formation of the new class. It cer-
tainly provided an important foundation for Making Capitalism without
Capitalists.56 Based on a theory of the fourth new class project of the
East Central European intelligentsia, Ivan and his coauthors explain so-
cial change in terms of the patterned attributes of economic, political,
and cultural elites at different points of time. They especially focused
on Hungary but to some extent took Poland, the Czech Republic, and to
a much lesser extent but for stark contrast, Russia, into account. Their
sense of capitalism was based on the qualities of these agents and their
theorized relationships to others, primarily within their class. In this
sense, The Intellectuals is not only a classic, but a living influence on
the theory of social transformations in postcommunist societies, mak-
ing intellectuals the abiding subject through which we can understand
social transformations.
This work and the subsequent professional sociological interpretation
of The Intellectuals appear closer to Ivan’s conscious representation of
his scholarship than to what was imputed to him during communist rule
in Hungary. Ivan has identified himself as Weberian, on the one hand,
emphasizing that our conceptual tools are always inadequate before
the complexities of reality, thereby only capturing what our values
lead us to recognize as important to address. He also self-identifies as
populist, in preferring the viewpoint on reality that is from the bottom,
from the underdog. Although he has focused on elites and intellectuals,
his interpretation of them rarely squares simply with their own self-
understanding and is more likely to be something plausible according
to those who are the beneficiaries, or victims, of their power. There are,
however, two dilemmas in this.
First, while these are portraits of intellectuals and elites, they are also
portraits of systems that might be understood through these positions,
albeit viewed from below. In this sense, the Marxist resonance remains
apparent, but flipped on its head: instead of recognizing the future with
the universal class at the bottom, we rest on understanding the present
by studying the ruling class we apparently wish to see in statu nascendi.
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This flirts with Marxism, therefore, but retreats from its ambition to
present the “real mechanisms” by its emphasis on the multiple valences
of social structure. We can see that disposition much more clearly after
communism than before it. And it fits with our own professional social
science, where we are invited to debate and “test” hypotheses that Ivan
and his colleagues have developed.
That Weberian humility was hard to recognize in the communist period,
however, for in those times the intellectual as hero, and as critical
social analyst, was more than someone offering a few hypotheses on
the system. It was, much more like Marxism, a knowledge culture that
was rooted in practice, demonstrating its consequence with political
reaction. That, in turn, made it difficult for Ivan to radicalize his ideas
without either leaving or becoming an opposition figure. He left, and
became the professional sociologist. Konrád stayed, and he became the
opposition figure.
We all could live vicariously with that communist era tension, but
the heroic choices leave out the ironies that make The Intellectuals
ultimately so special. It charmed those who could recognize the irony,
but more important, perhaps, it made those, including the political
police, worried that they would not get it, and therefore obliged to figure
out what they had to do with a couple of chaps at work in Csobanka.
That, in the end, might be the difference on which we need to focus in
order to appreciate The Intellectuals not only as an important work of
social science, but also as a dramatic reflection of a lost world in which
ideas appeared to have consequence before brute force.
Elevating irony in critical social science
During the symposium, Ivan pointed out that our recognition of irony
was quite appropriate. In fact, he said, he and his coauthors had re-
cently written a paper on how irony lies at the epistemological foun-
dation of his oeuvre, but the mainstream sociology journal to which it
was initially submitted declined to publish it. A journal more accus-
tomed to critical theory’s elaboration published it subsequently.57 It is
tough to capture in print the audience’s reception of this fine point,
but most appreciated how irony might be used to illuminate irony’s
own place in professional social science. However, the irony at work
in Thesis Eleven did not have the same critical power as I found in The
Intellectuals.
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In 2003, Ivan and his colleagues put irony in the place of socialism’s
counterculture.58 While they acknowledged humor’s importance, the
main place irony occupied was in absolution from responsibility for
identifying a positive normative standpoint from which to develop criti-
cal sociology. In this, socialism’s demise and globalization’s hegemony
become almost a relief for critical intellectuals, released from the
obligatory defense or critique of societies made in the name of their
allegiance. Nonetheless, irony’s revival is especially apparent in the
assessment of the fourth new class project.
Reflecting on Making Capitalism without Capitalists, Ivan and his
colleagues find intellectuals to be a particularly flawed class. While
Gouldner may have evaluated their flaw in terms of their distance from
universality,59 the intellectuals’ flaw in Eyal et al. (“On Irony”) comes in
their failure to hold onto power once they get it. Using their capacity for
rational discourse as the means by which they construct capitalism,60
much as they once constructed socialism, this East European intelli-
gentsia loses its distinction, or its power, as soon as it has the capacity
to realize it. Cultural capital might be good in collective approximation
for Weber’s charismatic authority, but it surely is not enough to sustain
class power in capitalism. Irony is certainly here, but not quite like it
was in The Intellectuals.
On rereading irony’s power in The Intellectuals I find something more
than the recognition of others’ points of view, the irrelevance of a
positive normative standpoint, the significance of critique, or even the
appeal of that wry smile. I rather notice its power, and not just its
feasibility. Irony’s wittiness is seditious; its engagement implies an
intellectual superiority that makes uncertain authorities nervous and
apprehensive. That kind of irony has no place in professional social
science, or at least no explicit place. Irony also has had little place in
the public culture of America and its most recent expression of imperial
globalization, but not because intellectuals do not have a place.
Nostalgia motivates our appreciation for The Intellectuals because it
reminds us of a time when intellectual authority and power was so great
that we might debate whether intellectuals were on the road to power.
But it was appealing not only because it was a worry, but also because
we could be proud that ideas were considered potentially dangerous,
and therefore consequential. Maybe Konrád and Szelényi were just
lucky to be living in a system where there were so many taboos, but
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those in the West were also lucky, for ideas appeared to matter during
communist rule regardless of where we lived.
Ideas clearly still matter. The ideology that has led the United States
to relatively unilateralist positions in ambitious plans to refashion the
world in its image, whether you agree with the ambition or not, is clearly
rooted in the ascendance of a particular intellectual culture that James
Mann has labeled “Vulcan.”61 But the mood is quite different, and here,
I think, it is because of the space afforded critical intellectuality and
the conditions of their consequence.
The difference between Hungary in the 1970s and the United States
after 9/11 may be that these neoconservative intellectuals in U.S. power
are not the lions Ivan imagined in the game preserve.62 Instead, and
with all due apologies to Pareto’s theory of elite circulation, those in
power today are foxes. They do not simply defend power; they know
how to get it and to outwit their adversaries. They are so accustomed
to, and prepared for, critique that they have made ideas beyond their
ken irrelevant and their own relatively unassailable. The occasional
irony of the isolated intellectual is not quite enough to produce the
confidence about the importance of ideas unattached to power. But the
cumulation of irony might be quite important, so long as its conditions
of consequence are kept in mind.
Konrád and Szelényi had coffee houses, but no matter how many Star-
bucks franchises appear in college towns, they don’t quite match the
power of Budapest’s communist-era New York Café. Just like the pro-
liferation of latte, America is overwhelmed with a cacophony of public
opinion registered in chat rooms across the Internet, and for the less
digitally devoted, a plethora of pundits on talk shows from radio to
television. An occasional opinion piece hints at the abiding appeal of
satire,63 but irony is certainly not enough unless we think about the
social conditions that make it significant.
The conditions of public discourse in commercialized media and frag-
mented Internet culture require critique of consequence to be connected
to outrageousness, not to the subtlety found in irony. Bluster is better,
demanding only notice, not a sophistication that recognizes an intel-
lectual’s disrespect. Perhaps we should welcome those who wish to
constrain academic expression – indeed, those who would monitor pro-
fessors for their expressions of intellectual diversity might, ironically,
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raise the value of ideas as they seek to limit them with harassments
of various sorts. But this, it seems, is guerilla intellectual war on the
sidelines, distractions from the real contests over the exercise of power,
designed to focus the contest on pseudo-academic values while making
the real debates ever more distant from intellectual engagement. With
this combination of aggressiveness and marginalization in the world
of ideas, I wonder, then, whether Ivan is really writing the sequels to
his own book of twenty-five years ago as he develops the sociology of
intellectuals on the road to class power. With all due apologies, I might
even speculate that Michael Moore is the Ivan Szelényi of our times,
and Dude, Where’s My Country64 is the real sequel to The Intellectuals
on the Road to Class Power.
After I suggested this in the forum, Michael Bernhard suggested that I
should look well beyond Michael Moore. After all, Comedy Central’s
Daily Show host Jon Stewart might be closer to irony’s power under
communism with his satirical wit and television reach to rock the vote.
Or maybe I should look more closely at Al Franken’s acerbic style for a
better comparison. Neither Stewart nor Franken has Moore’s populist
affect, however, nor can they make those who rule blink the way Moore
tries to do. Maybe it is just loyalty to a native son of Michigan, but
Moore represents something more dangerous than either of his comrade
critical humorists, and therefore a bit more like those intellectuals in
the ideological game reserves Konrád and Szelényi described.
Moore offends with directness, whether in his disregard for the
etiquette of the Academy Awards ceremony or in the bluntness of his
charges about presidential incompetence or irresponsibility and what
may lie behind it. It was tough enough before 9/11 to develop irony’s
significance in the cacophony of commercialism’s public sphere
and the fragmentation of the Internet’s public discourse, but with
war, the plausibility of irony as a critical discourse becomes almost
pathetic. Moore predicts, “for the next year, leading up to the 2004
election, all you are going to hear from Bush is how there is a war
going on, a war on terror, a war to liberate and rebuild Iraq, a war
against Iranian clerics, a war against North Korean nuclear madmen,
a war against Colombian drug lords, a war against extremism, a war
against Communism in Cuba, a war against Hamas, a war against. . ..
And to maintain endless war, they need endless fear, a fear that can
only be extended indefinitely by taking away our basic civil rights.”
(pp. 102–103). Look, for example, at the stampede to approve the
Patriot Act, which Moore finds to be a “gross misnomer,” identifying
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it as “un-American as Mein Kampf” (p. 104). This is not irony; this is
on the edge of libel, but it might also be the only form of critique that
can be heard in cacophonic capitalism mobilized around fear.
Jacobs and Smith rightly point out that a culture that cultivates ironic
reflection also contributes to the subversion of “totalizing conformist
discourses by deflating pretensions and deconstructing assumptions
about putatively common interests and realities.”65 It is hard to see
that irony in Moore because he is so in your face, in their face, but it
is also there in his self-deprecation and incredulous disbelief that his
America could be their America. His aggressive playfulness suggests
the very carnivalesque in public discourse Jacobs and Smith invite in
the invigoration of societal reflexivity. But it has to be on full volume
to be noticed. And that is a long way from Csobanka. America today
certainly has more than its share of ironists, but even with their multi-
plication it hardly seems that any consequent reflexivity will have an
effect unless it blasts through the media like a storm. Moore knows how
to get that center stage, while Szelényi hardly imagined this work being
celebrated as a classic when working with Konrád in their little dacha
back in Csobanka. But I also wonder if we might look back, twenty-
five years from now, wondering what made Moore so prescient, and
wondering how it was that irony on steroids contributed to the undoing
of intellectuals on the road to empire – or not. By the time this appears
in print, we should know.
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10. Ivan Szelényi, “The Prospects and Limits of the East European New Class Project: An Auto-
Critical Reflection in The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power,” Politics and Society 15
(1986–1987): 102–144.
11. Intellectuals, 225.
12. Pavel Campeanu, The Genesis of the Stalinist Social Order, special issue of International
Journal of Sociology 18 (1988).
13. Jan Gross, Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland’s Western Ukraine and
Western Byelorussia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
14. Intellectuals, 222, emphasis added.
15. Eric R. Wolf, Europe and the People Without History (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 1982).
16. Campeanu The Genesis; Márkus, “The Functioning”; János Kornai, Economics of Shortage
(Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishers, 1980). The original formulation of my argument
was written in 1988 – thus, before the collapse of socialism.
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and Szelényi’s analysis. They reserve the term “intelligentsia” for only the last of these three
components. I follow this convention throughout this comment.
19. Ibid., 207.
20. Ibid., 152, 159–160.
21. In the Czechlands, the indigenous nobility was exceptionally weak following its near de-
struction, conquest, and replacement by the Habsburgs. The Czech national revival of the
nineteenth century was led by an intelligentsia whose origins lay in the rise of the Czech
bourgeoisie. See Derek Sayer, The Coasts of Bohemia: A Czech History (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2000), chapters 3–4.
22. The position of the reformist intelligentsia in the Czechlands was perhaps even stronger
in the 1960s when they were the motivating force behind the Prague Spring. The post-
1968 repression strongly targeted these circles. See Milan Šimečka, The Restoration of Or-
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